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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
James Neal Moen appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Moen pied guilty to felony driving under the influence and a habitual
offender enhancement in exchange for dismissal or reduction of several other
charges.

State v. Moen, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 670, Docket 35907

(Idaho App., October 15, 2010). The district court imposed a sentence of eight
years with three years fixed and retained jurisdiction.

kl,

pp. 1-2.

Upon the

recommendation of the Department of Correction, the district court relinquished
jurisdiction about two months later because Moen "refused to follow rules and
instructions."

kl,

p. 2.

Moen filed a Rule 35 motion and request for counsel

asserting, among other things, "that his mental health issues were not addressed
or taken into consideration during sentencing."

kl

After determining the motion

was meritless, the district court denied both the motion and the request for
counsel.

kl

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the

motion and request for counsel, concluding the Rule 35 motion "failed to assert a
viable claim of an excessive sentence" and was therefore "frivolous," based on
the following procedural history:
At the sentencing hearing, Moen submitted a competency
evaluation and a substance abuse assessment for the district
court's consideration.
The competency evaluation provided
diagnoses of adjustment disorder with anxiety and personality
disorder with antisocial and narcissistic features, and the
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assessment provided that Moen had indications of mental health
problems. The competency evaluation also explained that Moen
acts out antisocially and has difficulty coping with the legal system
when he does not get his way. At the jurisdictional review hearing,
the district court inquired whether Moen had the resources to obtain
a psychological evaluation. After Moen's counsel stated that it was
likely that an evaluation could be accomplished, the district court
continued the hearing. At the continued hearing, Moen requested
another continuance so that he could complete a psychological
evaluation, which the district court granted. However, when the
hearing was finally held, Moen proceeded despite the fact that no
evaluation had been accomplished.
pp. 2-3 (footnote omitted).
Moen filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting violations of his
rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by both the district
court and his trial counsel, and ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate
counsel.

(R, pp. 7-13, 36-43, 52-66, 118-32.)

His requested relief was a

reduction of his sentence to a four-year fixed term.

(R., p. 9.)

The state

answered (R, pp. 115-16) and moved to dismiss (Augmentation, pp. 112-13).
The district court also provided notice of intent to dismiss. (Augmentation, pp.
126-29.) The district court thereafter dismissed. (R, p. 181.) Moen filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp. 183-87.)

2

ISSUES
Moen states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Moen's
claims because he presented issues of fact that entitled him
to post-conviction relief?

2.

Did the district court violate Mr. Moen's right to due process
and abuse its discretion by denying him of [sic] a meaningful
opportunity to present his post-conviction claims, [by]
allowing counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint
replacement counsel?

3.

Did the district court violate Mr. Moen's right to due process
in dismissing several of his post-conviction claims sua
sponte and without prior notice?

(Appellant's brief, p. 30.) The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

The district court granted Moen two extensions to secure and present
additional psychological evidence for sentencing, yet ultimately Moen did
not present such evidence. Is Moen's claim that he did not have the
opportunity to present favorable evidence frivolous?

2.

Has Moen failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in relation to his guilty plea?

3.

Has Moen failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to sentencing and
relinquishment of jurisdiction proceedings?

4.

Has Moen failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim that
the district court violated the plea agreement?

5.

Has Moen failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim that
the district court was not an impartial tribunal?

6.

Is Moen's claim that the district court erred by not overruling precedent of
the Supreme Court of the United States frivolous?

7.

Has Moen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by not
appointing new counsel after Moen's post-conviction counsel withdrew
from the case?

8.

Has Moen failed to show he was provided inadequate notice?
3

ARGUMENT
I.
Moen's Claims That The District Court Violated His Due Process Right To
Present Psychological Evidence At Sentencing Is Frivolous

A.

Introduction
Moen alleged the district court violated his rights by proceeding to

sentencing without a "proper" psychological evaluation. (R., p. 23.) He asserts
on appeal that this allegation established a prima facie claim that the district court
violated his due process rights at sentencing and in relinquishing jurisdiction by
not ordering a psychological evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522, and therefore erred
in summarily dismissing this claim.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 31-42.)

Moen's

argument is frivolous because due process only requires the opportunity to
present evidence, and therefore did not require the trial court to order Moen to
obtain a psychological evaluation.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief.

Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221

(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986).
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C.

Moen's Claim Of A Due Process Violation Is Frivolous Because Due
Process Requires Only The Opportunity To Present Evidence
"The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and

United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process
be given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard." State v.
Blair, 149 Idaho 720, 722, 239 P.3d 825, 827 (Ct. App. 2010). Due process is
afforded if the person whose liberty or property interest is at stake is afforded
"meaningful notice and opportunity to present evidence that is relevant" to the
proceeding.

&

Three safeguards are required to assure due process in

sentencing: (1) an opportunity to present favorable evidence; (2) an opportunity
to examine all materials "contained in the presentence report"; and (3) an
opportunity to explain or rebut adverse evidence. State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170,

174-75, 90 P.3d 920, 924-25 (Ct. App. 2004).

In the criminal case Moen was

given the opportunity to examine and respond to the psychological evidence
presented at sentencing and to provide additional psychological evidence.
Moen, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 670, at pp. 2-3. (See also #35907 9/11/08
Tr., p. 47, L. 5- p. 48, L. 15 (court asking ifthere are more evaluations needed)).
The district court very clearly did not deny Moen a meaningful opportunity
to present favorable evidence.

Moen's argument that the district court had to

order Moen to secure favorable evidence, in the form of a psychological
evaluation, in order to give him a meaningful opportunity to be heard (Appellant's

5

brief, pp. 31-42 1 ) is frivolous.

Moen has failed to show error in the summary

dismissal of his claim that the district court violated

due process rights.

11.
The District Court Properly Dismissed Moen's Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel In Relation To The Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
As part of a plea agreement that resolved three felony cases, Moen pied

guilty to a charge of battery, reduced from domestic battery, and received a
sentence of credit for time served. (#35907 9/11/08 Tr., p. 4, L. 10

p. 19, L. 21;

p. 24, L. 2- p. 25, L. 6; p. 81, Ls. 7-10; #35907 R., pp. 40-41.) In post-conviction
Moen asserted his trial counsel coerced his guilty plea to a reduced charge of
battery despite his claims of innocence. (R., p. 26.) The district court provided
notice that it intended to dismiss the petition for lack of supporting evidence
(Augmentation, pp. 127-28) and dismissed the petition (R., p. 181).

Moen

asserts the district court erred (Appellant's brief, pp. 43-46), but fails to cite any
evidence in the record supporting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Moen asserts that I. C. § 19-2522 "implement[s]" due process safeguards, and
therefore failure to sua sponte order an evaluation violated due process.
1

(Appellant's brief, p. 31.) The Idaho Supreme Court has rejected this argument.
State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 311 P.3d 283, 285 (2013) (claimed violation of
I.C. § 19-2522 not reviewable as fundamental error because "failure to sua
sponte order the evaluation did not violate a constitutional right"). Moen also
asserts the district court violated due process by not ordering a psychological
evaluation prior to relinquishing jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 39-42.) Again,
this argument is directly contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent. State v.
Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143, 30 P.3d 293, 298 (2001) (dua process does not
apply to relinquishment of jurisdiction as no liberty interest is at stake). Neither of
these controlling precedents is cited in the Appellant's brief.
6

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).

On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

C.

Moen Presented No Evidence Supporting His Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel
A petitioner seeking relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

must prove "that his counsel was deficient in his performance and that this
deficiency resulted in prejudice." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d
1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d
424 (1989)). To establish deficient performance the petitioner must overcome a
strong presumption that counsel performed within the wide range of professional
assistance by proving trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382, 247 P.3d 582, 609
(201 O); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v.
State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To meet this
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burden "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish
prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v.
State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a
guilty plea, "[i]n order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."

Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted). "Moreover, to
obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a
decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances."

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v.

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
Trial counsel negotiated a plea agreement regarding three felony charges
whereby Moen pied guilty to one felony (DUI), the state dismissed a second
felony (intimidating a witness), and the third (domestic battery) was reduced to a
misdemeanor so that no additional time would have to be served. There is no
evidence in the record supporting a claim that counsel in any way performed
deficiently and, far from alleging he would have rejected the plea agreement and
gone to trial, Moen's only requested remedy was a reduction in his felony DUI

8

sentence. On appeal Moen asserts his guilty plea was involuntary, but fails to
cite any evidence that any alleged defects in the plea agreement were

fault of

counsel and does not even address the relevant prejudice question of whether
Moen would have reasonably rejected the plea agreement and demanded a trial
on the three felonies.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 42-46.)

Because Moen failed to

present any evidence of deficient performance and did not even allege prejudice,
dismissal was proper.

111.
Moen Has Failed To Show Error In The Dismissal Of Claims Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel At Sentencing And Relinquishment Of Jurisdiction
Proceedings
A.

Introduction
Moen asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure a

psychological

evaluation

for

relinquishment of jurisdiction.

both

the

sentencing

and

the

hearing

on

(R., pp. 54-59.) On appeal he asserts that it is

enough for him to have demonstrated the possibility of a mental illness to get a
hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in not securing an
evaluation.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 46-52.) That Moen may have had a mental

illness is not, standing alone, evidence that his counsel was deficient for not
obtaining or presenting a psychological evaluation, much less evidence of
prejudice.

The district court therefore properly dismissed this claim as

unsupported by evidence sufficient to raise a prima facie claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

9

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal

a post-conviction petition,

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999).

C.

Moen Failed To Present Evidence Tending To Show Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel In Sentencing Or The Jurisdictional Review
To show ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must demonstrate

both that counsel's performance was deficient and that such deficiency
prejudiced the defense.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

Strategic choices of counsel are reviewed deferentially, and if "made after
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable."

&

at 690. "The duty to investigate requires only that counsel

conduct a reasonable investigation." Steven v. State,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d
2013 WL 6423426 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,
280, 971 P.2d 727, 733 (1998)).

Decisions to follow a particular trial or

sentencing strategy that make "particular investigations unnecessary" are entitled
to "a heavy measure of deference." Cullen v. Pinholster, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct
1388 (2011) (citing Strickland).

That an attorney could have presented "more

evidence" or even "more persuasive evidence" "does not mean" counsel has
been ineffective. State v. Pavne, 146 Idaho 548, 578, 199 P.3d 123, 153 (2008).
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In the criminal case trial counsel elected to pursue a strategy based more
on evaluations related to alcohol abuse and rehabilitation than on mental
issues. (See #359079/11/08 Tr., p. 47, L. 5 - p. 48, L. 15 (counsel stating intent
to proceed to sentencing with substance abuse evaluation and not mental health
evaluation).) Such was a reasonable strategy in a DUI sentencing. That strategy
reinforced by evidence suggesting that Moen suffered from untreatable
adjustment or

'Jnality disorders rather than treatable mental illnesses. (R.,

pp. 86-89.) Moen presc,,

tactical decision to pursue a

sentencing strategy of addressing his addictions rather than his personality
disorders was unreasonable or that he suffered any prejudice.
Moen did submit two pieces of evidence he believed supported his claim.
First, Moen provided a document purporting to be a letter indicating his girlfriend,
on February 4, 2009, made an appointment for a psychological evaluation on
March 2, 2009. (R., p. 15.) Because these events were after sentencing, this
evidence is not relevant to any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing. Nor does the evidence support a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in relation to the jurisdictional review hearing 2 because, at best, the
timing of events indicates any failure to obtain an evaluation was not the fault of
counseL

The first jurisdictional review hearing was scheduled for January 9, 2009,
and set over until January 14, 2009.

(#35907 R., pp. 62-63.)

The court

Moen has failed to establish that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel even
applies at a jurisdictional review hearing. The state will assume, for purposes of
this brief, that there is a statutory right imposing similar standards of competence.
2
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continued the hearing a second time, until January 26, 2009. (#35907 R., pp. 6973.) The hearing was then again continued until February 18, 2009. (#35907 R.,
pp. 74-75.) The hearing was eventually held on February 23, 2009.

(#35907

Supp. Tr.) The letter thus indicates that Moen waited until February 4, 2009after the hearing had been continued three times-to make an appointment for
an evaluation. The appointment for the evaluation was, in turn, scheduled for a
date weeks after the date for the hearing.

This is not evidence that counsel

performed deficiently in scheduling an evaluation.
The other evidence Moen submitted is a single page of a purported 2009
psychological evaluation.

(R., pp. 56-57, 111.)

Moen did not provide the

remainder of the evaluation, including evidence of whether the evaluation
preceded or followed the hearing on retained jurisdiction. The single page of the
evaluation he produced contained diagnoses of "numerous psychiatric issues
that were quite severe in nature, and could lead to an increased risk to reoffend."
(R., p. 111.) Moen's "mood and personality disorders" made him "very impulsive

and aggressive" and created the "possibility of intense violence." (R., p. 111.)
Neither deficient performance nor prejud

is suggested by this evidence.

Overall, the evidence indicates that counsel would not have done Moen any
favors by making sure this evaluation was before the sentencing court.
Moen has failed to show any deficient performance in counsel's tactical
election to focus on alcohol abuse instead of mental illness for purposes of
sentencing. Moreover, his evidence has affirmatively shown a lack of prejudice
by demonstrating that a psychological evaluation would have been far more

12

damning than helpful in sentencing. Moen failed to present admissible evidence
demonstrating a prima facie claim of either prong of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.

IV.
Moen's Assertion That The District Court Violated The Plea Agreement Is
Frivolous

A

Introduction
Moen alleged the trial court committed "judicial misconduct" by failing to

make an "appropriate recommendation" to the Department of Correction and
adding to the terms of the plea agreement when it recommended "level A"
therapy during the retained jurisdiction program

(R., p. 8, 23-34.) On appeal

Moen asserts this constituted a viable post-conviction claim of a due process
violation by the district court.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 52-55.)

Review of the

relevant law shows this assertion to be frivolous.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition,

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999).
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Moen's Claim That The District Court Violated His Due Process Rights By
Recommending A Programming Level Is Frivolous
Moen argues that the district court's recommendation to the Department of
Correction that Moen complete level A programming on his rider violated his due
process rights in two ways: by rendering his guilty plea involuntary and by
imposing an impossible condition of probation.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 52-55.)

This argument is directly contrary to well established and basic principles of due
process law, and is therefore frivolous.
Moen's contention that the district court's actions at sentencing rendered
the plea invalid was "repudiated" by the Supreme Court of the United States in
2009.

McAmis v. State,

Idaho_, 317 P.3d 49, 50-51 (Ct. App. 2013)

(citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009)). Taking Moen's guilty
plea certainly did not breach any plea agreement, and no part of the sentence is
in any way inconsistent with the terms of the agreement.

Even if there were

evidence the trial court had taken some action inconsistent with the plea
agreement at sentencing, Moen's claim that such rendered invalid his previously
entered plea is without legal merit.
Moen's claim that the district court violated his due process rights by
imposing a term of probation that was impossible to fulfill when it recommended
level A programming during the retained jurisdiction program is equally frivolous.
First, Moen was not put on probation. Although due process applies before the
liberty interest held by a probationer may be taken by the government, State v.
Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 871, 292 P.3d 258, 262 (2012), an inmate on retained
jurisdiction has no "constitutionally protected liberty interest" in the hope of a
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future probation, and therefore no right to additional process, State v. Coassolo,
136 Idaho 138, 142-43, 30 P.3d 293, 297-98 (2001). 3 Moen's assertion that due
process forbad the trial court's recommendation for programming in relation to
his retained jurisdiction is devoid of legal or factual support, and is therefore
frivolous.

V.
Moen Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim The
Court Was Not An Impartial Tribunal

A

Introduction
Moen alleged that in the criminal proceedings the court engaged in

"judicial misconduct" such as going "outside the bounds" of the plea agreement,
recommending "Level A" on his rider even though Moen was incapable of
succeeding at that level, coercing his guilty plea, and "mishandling" letters
between him and his attorney. (R., pp. 8, 24.) Moen later moved to amend his
petition to allege the trial judge had "contacted the Department of Corrections
[sic]" and "sabotaged Petitioner's program." (Augmentation, pp. 43, 76.) He also
sought to include allegations that the number of appeals of rulings by the district
judge was evidence of his corruption, but that the district judge is affirmed

Although Moen has cited cases for the proposition that a condition of probation
impossible of fulfillment is improper because it does not serve rehabilitation, he
has cited no cases indicating such a rule is of constitutional origin. (Appellant's
brief, p. 54.) Because the primary purpose of retained jurisdiction is to determine
the defendant's suitability for probation, learning that a defendant cannot qualify
for or complete necessary programming during the retained jurisdiction period is
a good way to avoid impossible conditions of probation later.
3
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because the Idaho Court of Appeals is "just as corrupt because they are cronys
[sic]."

(Id.)

The district court denied Moen's attempts

amend his petition.

(Augmentation, p. 100.) The district court ultimately concluded Moen's claims in
his petition were "unsubstantiated conclusory allegations" and he had failed to
present "evidence sufficient to support any grounds upon which relief can be
granted." (Augmentation, p. 128.)
On appeal Moen asserts he stated a viable claim that the judge in his
criminal case was biased and therefore violated his right to a fair tribunal.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 55-57.)

Specifically, Moen asserts on appeal that the

"district court communicated with the counselor outside Mr. Moen's presence,
failed to address the attorney letters in the court file, failed to protect Mr. Moen's
health by ensuring adequate mental health treatment and otherwise failed to act
impartially." (Appellant's brief, p. 57.) Even a cursory review of this argument
shows it is frivolous.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280

(Ct App. 1986).
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C.

Moen's Appellate Arguments That He Presented Evidence Of A Prima
Facie Claim That The Court Was Biased And Thus An Unfair Tribunal Are
Specious
"It is axiomatic that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due

process." State v. Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454, _ , 314 P.3d 136, 140 (2013)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).

There are three circumstances

indicating bias that are impermissible under the Due Process Clause: "(1)
instances where the judge has a financial interest in the outcome of the case; (2)
the situation where a judge charges a defendant with criminal contempt and then
proceeds to try him on the charge; and (3) cases where a person with a personal
stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case."

bi at_, 314 P.3d at 141 (internal citations

omitted). A judge need not disqualify himself if he "can make the proper legal
analysis" and the appellate court "presume[s] that a sentencing judge is able to
ascertain the relevancy and reliability of a broad range of information which may
be presented during the sentencing process, and to disregard that which is
irrelevant and unreliable."

bi (internal quotations and citations omitted).

"Furthermore, a trial judge's exposure to evidence, admissible or not, standing
alone, does not demonstrate bias at sentencing."

bi

During the hearing on retained jurisdiction Moen claimed that his
counselor had told him that she had talked with the judge and told him "the judge
had nothing good to say about [Moen]." (#35907 Supp.

, p. 56, L. 3 - p. 57, L.

16.) The counselor confirmed having a phone conversation with the judge. (Id.
at p. 83, L. 9 - p. 84, L. 10.) She testified that the judge informed her that Moen
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would not be relinquished merely because the Department of Correction
placed him in

A programming. (Id.

not

p. 85, L. 22 - p. 89, L. 15.) The court

made explicit findings of fact regarding that conversation, including that he made
the call in response to a letter from Moen's counsel to the IDOC counselor, which
was copied to the court, and that he took an accurate note of the conversation
and provided this note to both counsel prior to the relinquishment hearing. (Id. at
p. 115, L. 19 - p. 116, L. 6; Augmentation, p. 298.) Although a call directly to the
counselor by the judge was not the best practice, the record shows the judge
was merely trying to clarify his order once questions about the significance of his
recommendation for placement in level A programming had been raised by
Moen. The judge was trying to give Moen the best chance of succeeding on the
rider;

Moen's claims the judge was casting

aspersions or deliberately

undermining his chances of success are both devoid of admissible evidence and
affirmatively disproved by the record. Likewise, Moen's appellate claim that the
counselor conveyed information that influenced the judge at the relinquishment
hearing (Appellant's brief, pp. 56-57) was never pied below, lacks support by any
admissible evidence, and is disproved by the record. Clearly Moen had a full and
fair opportunity to explore the telephone conversation at the relinquishment
hearing, in fact did so, and facts disproving his current claim were established in
the record.
Moen next claims the court "failed to address the attorney letters in the
court file." (Appellant's brief, p. 57.) This claim is directly contrary to the record.
At the relinquishment hearing the matter was raised and fully addressed.
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(#35907 Supp. Tr., p. 109, L. 11 - p. 113,

3.) The court informed Moen it had

not read the letters and offered to return them unread. (Id. at p. 112,

10 - p.

113, L. 3.) Moen's arguments-that "the existence of privileged communications
in the court file certainly raises the appearance of impropriety"; that the court
failed to reprimand the jail; and that the court was obviously unprepared for the
hearing because it had not read the fetters (Appellant's brief p. 57 (including note
6))-are wholly irrelevant to any claim the court was biased.

There is no

evidence the judge sought out or personally obtained the letters (the evidence is
exactly to the contrary) so there is no evidence that the judge was involved in any
impropriety that might have existed. Likewise, what actions the court did or did
not take to address any alleged violation of the attorney client privilege by third
parties has no relevance to a claim he was biased against Moen. Again, Moen's
appellate assertions are frivolous.
Finally, Moen asserts the court failed to "ensur[e]" he had "adequate
mental health treatment." (Appellant's brief, p. 57.) The judge did not decide
what mental health treatment Moen received while incarcerated, the Department
of Correction did. This claim is specious.
To show that the court was not acting as the constitutional tribunal
required by due process is a high bar. Moen's claims did not get close enough to
that bar to even go under it.
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VI.
Moen's Claim He ls Entitled To An Evidentiary Hearing On Whether He Was
Entitled To A Grand Jury Indictment Is Frivolous
Moen argues the court erred by not letting him pursue to an evidentiary
hearing his claim that he was entitled to by an indictment returned by a grand jury
(as opposed to an information filed after a preliminary hearing).

(Appellant's

brief, pp. 58-60.) Moen did not have a federal constitutional right to a grand jury
indictment in a state court criminal proceeding. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516 (1884). Moen has failed to show the district court erred by failing to overrule
the Supreme Court of the United States. 4

Moen's appellate argument is

frivolous.

VII.
Moen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Granting PostConviction Counsel's Motion To Withdraw
A.

Introduction
The district court appointed counsel to represent Moen in this post-

conviction action.

(Augmentation, pp. 2, 5, 16-17.)

Moen moved to appoint

himself co-counsel because counsel was "unwilling to file motions
request."

(Augmentation, pp. 33-35.)

He filed

[his]

a "Motion for Intervention

The general rule is that decisions announcing new rules are to be applied "to all
criminal cases still pending on direct review" and are applied retroactively (to
collateral attacks on final judgments) only in limited circumstances. Rhoades v.
State, 149 Idaho 130, 233 P.3d 61 (2010). See also Whorton v. Bockting, 549
U.S. 406, 416 (2007) ("new rule" applies to cases on direct review but generally
not retroactively to collateral attacks on final judgments). Thus, even if the
Supreme Court of the United States chooses to overrule Hurtado at some point
Moen would not be able to use such overruling to collaterally attack his
conviction in this post-conviction action.
4

20

Between Attorney/Client" asserting his counsel was "do[ing] absolutely nothing in
case," "tried to discourage [him] from presenting key issues," "refus[ed]

file

motions," "has sided with the prosecution and is sabotaging this case," and that
refusing to remove his current counsel would be "an act of communism and
treason."

(Augmentation, pp. 49-51.)

appeared for Moen.

A few months later substitute counsel

(Augmentation, pp. 114-15.)

Substiutute counsel later

moved to withdraw for lack of cooperation of his client. (Augmentation, pp. 11617; Tr., p. 6, L. 25

p. 11, L. 24.) The district court granted counsel's motion to

withdraw, and determined that new counsel should not be appointed because the
allegations in the supplemental petition were "unsupported by any evidence" and
that the facts alleged did not "raise the possibility of a valid claim." (Tr., p. 14, L.
4 - p. 15, L. 4; Augmentation, p. 130.)

Shortly thereafter the district court

dismissed the petition. (R., p. 181.)
Moen claims the district court violated his due process rights by not
appointing new counsel to represent him when his appointed counsel withdrew.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 60-76.) Because Moen had failed to raise the possibility of
a valid claim, however, he has failed to show any error in the district court's
exercise of discretion in declining to appoint counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
Denial of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is reviewed for an abuse

of discretion. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111
(2004). "In reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post
conviction proceedings, '[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of
21

fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
free review."'

As to questions of

this Court

Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P .3d

1111

(quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001 )).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Concluding That
Appointment Of New Counsel Was Not Called For Because Even With
The Assistance Of Counsel Moen Had Failed To Allege Non-Frivolous
Claims
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies

financially and "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to
conduct a further investigation into the claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
655, 152 P .3d 12, 16 (2007), see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793,
102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004).

"Facts sufficient to state a claim may not be

alleged because they do not exist or because the pro se applicant does not know
the essential elements of a claim." Gonzalez v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172, 254
P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at
1112). Review of the record supports the district court's conclusion that there
was no factual basis for Moen's claims.
First, Moen had the benefit of two different attorneys for over 18 months.
(Augmentation

pp.

2

(April

29,

2011

appointment of counsel),

114-15

(substitution of counsel), 130 (November 16, 2012 order permitting withdrawal of
counsel).) Counsel filed a supplemental petition on Moen's behalf. (R., pp. 118.) Moen cannot claim that any lack of factual development of his pleadings
was because of lack of counsel. Moen's inability to formulate a viable claim
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post-conviction relief even with the assistance of counsel demonstrates that the
court properly exercised its discretion because

is no reason to

believe that any deficiencies in the pleadings were because of Moen's ignorance,
as opposed to lack of merit.
Second, as articulated above, Moen's claims for relief range from
meritless to frivolous. Moen asserts other "claims" are possibly valid (Appellant's
brief,

pp.

69-76

(asserting

ineffective

assistance

of appellate

counsel;

prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to
suppress; that the DUI statute is unconstitutional or invalid; his DUI was not a
felony; disparate sentencing and cruel and unusual punishment; and an
argument that multiple frivolous claims may be aggregated to show the possibility
of a valid claim), but cites to nowhere in the record that these "claims" were
raised in pleadings, much less demonstrates that they were presented in verified
form with supporting evidence. 5

On its face Moen's argument that the court

should have appointed counsel to pursue claims that prior counsel did not elect
to pursue and were never raised in actual pleadings or supported by any
evidence or law is frivolous.
Finally, Moen asserts that he is entitled to such procedures as a contested
hearing on whether he is entitled to counsel and requiring the district court to

As set forth in more detail below, it would have been error for the district court to
address these claims, which were not raised as causes of action in actual
pleadings, in summary dismissal proceedings. See Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho
517, 523-24, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283-84 (2010). Moen's belief that new counsel
would have successfully amended the pleading to include these claims is
unjustified on the record.
5
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address his concerns about previous counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp. 62-68.) A
petitioner's right to counsel in
Hall v. State, 1

statute. See

proceedings is

Idaho 610, _ , 315 P.3d 798, 804 (2013).

The Applicable

statute, I.C. § 19-4904, does not grant these rights claimed by Moen.

The

applicable standard, set forth in more detail above, is whether the district court
correctly determined that Moen had failed to set forth the possibility of a valid
claim. Because there is no reason to believe that any of the claims asserted by
Moen are valid or could be rendered valid by additional assistance of counsel,
the district court did not err by denying appointment of new counsel after
appointed counsel withdrew.

VIII.
Moen Had More Than Adeauate Notice Prior To Dismissal Of His Petition

A.

Introduction
Moen asserts he had inadequate notice because the state's motion to

dismiss and the district court's notice of intent to dismiss failed to address "the
claims Mr. Moen raised pro se." (Appellant's brief, p. 78.)

Specifically, Moen

claims the court was required to "address the later submissions ... which were
filed after the district court deprived [sic] Mr. Moen of counsel." (Id.) The record
shows the district court provided its notice of intent to dismiss at the same time it
denied appointment of new counsel.

(Augmentation, pp. 126, 130.)

Moen's

argument that the court was supposed to anticipate his response to the notice of
intent to dismiss and preemptively address that response is frivolous.
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Moen Has Failed To Show That He Was Denied Notice
Although a post-conviction petitioner may not challenge

adequacy of

notice for the first time on appeal, he may challenge the absence of notice. Kelly
v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521-22, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281-82 (2010). Where the
motion seeks summary dismissal of all claims for lack of evidentiary support and
there was no request for clarification, the motion or notice of intent to dismiss
cannot be challenged on appeal "irrespective of whether that notice was
sufficient."

kl at 522-23,

236 P.3d at 1282-83.

The state moved for dismissal of all claims on the basis that they were
supported only by "conclusory allegations unsupported by factual evidence."
(Augmentation, pp. 112-13.)

The district court addressed the claims in the

petition and supplemental petition in more detail, finding both factual and legal
deficiencies in the claims.

(Augmentation, pp. 126-29.)

Moen was provided

notice that the claims he had asserted in his pleadings were subject to summary
dismissal because they were unsupported by admissible evidence, were legally
deficient, or both, and therefore there is no error shown on appeal with the
dismissal of the petition and supplemental petition.

C.

The Court Did Not Have To Provide Notice Of Intent To Dismiss Causes
Of Action Never Raised In The Pleadings
Moen also contends he raised several causes of action in his "pro se

submissions" that were unaddressed in the state's motion and court's notice.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 76-78.) Moen cites no law that causes of action raised
outside of a petition must be addressed in a motion to dismiss that petition. (Id.)
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The law is to

contrary: "It is clearly

action not raised

under Idaho law that a cause

party's pleadings may not be considered on summary

judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal." Kelly, 149 Idaho
at 523-24, 236 P .3d at 1283-84.

Thus, under "clearly established Idaho law"

completely ignored by Moen, not only was it not error for the court to not consider
Moen's attempts to raise new claims, it would have been error for it to do so. !s;L
Moen, far from showing error, is actively encouraging it. His appellate claim of
lack of notice prior to dismissal of causes of action asserted outside the
pleadings must be rejected.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal
of Moen's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 25th day of February

(

"=~~,;::_---=~~
K
Deputy Attorney GeAeral
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